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Abstract
Many successful franchise chains directly own a positive fraction of stores – a struc-
ture referred to as plural form. We propose that this ownership structure is chosen as a
commitment not to expropriate franchisees. The theoretical model is based on an empir-
ical analysis of contract and interview data from the US fast-food sector and well known
stylized facts: First, franchisees typically have strong contractual obligations to imple-
ment activities selected by the chain. Second, franchisees pay a revenue-based royalty
to the chain. Therefore, the chain has incentives to select ineﬃcient activities that yield
high revenues but are too costly. If uniform standards require that activities must be the
same in company-owned and franchise stores, a substantial fraction of company-owned
stores works as a commitment device to select more eﬃcient activities. The theoretical
analysis further predicts that a strong contractual commitment to uniform standards is
preferable if the fraction of company-owned stores is suﬃciently high. This prediction is
supported by our data.
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11 Introduction
Franchising is a widespread phenomena. According to estimates for the year 2001 (IFA
and PWC, 2004), there were more than 760,000 franchised businesses in the US, which
generated a total economic output of more than $1.53 trillion.
One puzzling empirical regularity in franchising is the stable coexistence of franchised
and company-owned stores within a chain. Following Bradach & Eccles (1989), we call
this arrangement a plural form.1 In an extensive panel-data study Lafontaine and Shaw
(2005) show that after some adjustment period the fraction of company-owned stores
remains relatively stable in most franchise chains and seems to be deliberately targeted.2
On average 15% of stores of established franchise chains are directly company-owned,
but this numbers varies considerably between and within sectors. Several alternative
explanations for the plural form have been discussed in the existing literature, which we
will review in Section 2.
We have collected contract, interview and background data from the US fast-food
industry to motivate a game-theoretic analysis that illustrates an additional reason for the
plural form. The analysis is based on two stylized facts about franchise contracts, which
hold in our sample and are more generally observed in franchising (see e.g. Bradach,
1998, or Blair & Lafontaine, 2005, for overviews): First, contracts typically give the
chain strong power to decide upon certain activities, like introduction of new products
or changes in building requirements. Once a chain selects such an activity, it must be
implemented by franchisees. Second, franchisees have to pay royalties, which are fraction
of sales-revenues, to the chain.3
These two contractual features create a source of ineﬃciencies in decision making.
Since royalties are based on revenues, and costs are born only by franchisees, the chain
has incentives to choose ineﬃcient activities that lead to high revenues but can be very
costly for a store. A substantial fraction of company-stores can function as a commitment
device for the chain to select more eﬃcient activities, however. Such a commitment eﬀect
is present when the chain is obliged to uniform standards that require that the same
activities must be selected for company-owned stores as for franchise stores. The reason
is simply that for the fraction of the chain’s total income that is contributed by company-
owned stores, the cost of activities are fully internalized. Therefore, ineﬃcient activities
that lead to high revenues – but are very costly – become less attractive as the fraction
1This arrangement is also known as dual distribution or contract mixing.
2For previous empirical studies, see e.g. Lutz (1992), Lafontaine (1992), Thompson (1994), Scott
(1995) and Lafontaine and Shaw (1999).
3The literature discuss several reasons for royalties on revenues, which we review in Section 2.
2of company-owned stores increases.1
In Section 3, we perform the game theoretic analysis in which we consider three cases.
In the ﬁrst case, we assume that the chain is obliged to uniform standards between
company-owned and franchise stores and chooses endogenously the optimal fraction of
company-owned stores. We model the interaction between the chain and franchisees via
a three stage game. In the ﬁrst stage, the chain commits to a fraction of company-owned
stores and oﬀe r saf r a n c h i s ec o n t r a c tt h a ts p e c i ﬁes the royalty. When franchisees accept
the contract in Stage 2, nature draws a state of the world that determines revenues and
costs, as well as the optimal chain-wide activities. In Stage 3, the chain observes the state
of the world and selects a chain-wide activity. Finally revenues and costs are realized and
split according to the franchise contract. We show that the chain may select a positive
fraction of company-owned stores, even if company-owned stores are run less eﬃciently
than franchise stores. Thus, the plural form endogenously results from our model.
In the second case, the chain selects not only the fraction of company-owned stores, but
also decides whether to commit to uniform standards between franchise and company-
owned stores. The analysis straightforwardly shows that in this case it is always optimal
for the chain to contractually commit itself to such uniform standards.
Finally, we analyse the case where the optimal fraction of company-owned stores is
determined by factors outside our model (the literature review in Section 2 summarizes
several such factors). We consider the extreme case where the fraction of company-
owned stores is completely exogenous and analyse when it is optimal for the chain to
have a contractual commitment to uniform standards. We show that for a suﬃciently
high fraction of company-owned stores, it is optimal to include such a commitment into
the contract whereas for a suﬃciently low fraction of company-owned stores, it is optimal
not to have such a commitment.
This prediction is supported by our empirical analysis in Section 4. We ﬁnd a sig-
niﬁcant correlation between the fraction of company-owned stores and the strength of
a contractual commitment to uniform standards in the data. We conﬁrm in an ordered
probit regression that this positive relation is robust to the inclusion of several control
variables like a chain’s size, age or its main product. Furthermore, Section 4 gives a
descriptive overview of the contract contents and interview responses with respect to
questions about the plural form, decision structures, and commitment to uniform stan-
dards. Section 5 brieﬂy concludes. Unless stated otherwise, all proofs can be found in
the appendix.
1The basic idea that company-owned stores may lead to to selection of more eﬃcient activities has
already been previously examined in two unpublished papers, including a case study of 5 franchise chains,
by the second author – see Lewin-Solomons (2000a and 2000b).
32 Background and Related Literature
Company-owned Stores and Franchise Stores
Before we can explore how the mix of franchised and company-owned stores aﬀects a
chain’s dynamic eﬃciency, we must understand the deﬁning characteristics of these two
forms.
Probably the most important distinction can be found in the diﬀerent incentives in-
duced by franchise contracts and employment contracts of company-stores manager: A
franchisee has to pay a fraction of revenues to the chain as a royalty. (Often there is
also an initial fee upon opening a store, which is mainly used to cover setup and training
costs – see Scott, 1995 or Lafontaine, 1992.) The remainder of proﬁts are hers to keep,
however. By contrast, a company manager is an employee with a mainly ﬁxed salary.
Therefore, franchisees’ incentives for proﬁt maximization are very strong, whereas a
company manager’s incentives are quite weak. In result, as even company representatives
often readily admit,1 franchised stores typically outperform those that are company-
owned.
A second issue is whether company-owned stores substantially diﬀer from franchise
stores in so far that direct ownership grants additional residual rights of control. Such
residual rights of controls are an key element if ownership structures are compared from
a perspective of incomplete contracts, see e.g. Grossman and Hart (1986).
Overall, diﬀerences in control rights seem not to be very pronounced in franchise
chains, however, because the chain has typically also very strong control rights over
franchise stores. A franchisee is contractually bound to adhere to the chain’s ”operations
manual”, which speciﬁes how the store is to be run. Any deviation from this manual
occurs only with the permission or acquiescence of the chain, and most chains have the
p o w e rt oc h a n g et h i sm a n u a lu n i l a t e r a l l y( m o r eo nt h i sl a t e ri nt h ee m p i r i c a ls e c t i o n ) .
R e a s o n sf o rR o y a l t i e so nR e v e n u e s
Although royalties on revenues yield high powered incentives for franchisees, similar in-
centives could also be created by alternative contractual arrangements like royalties on
proﬁts or ﬁxed annual fees. Considering the drawbacks outlined in the introduction, it
1Proﬁt statistics are not readily available due to their sensitivity. However, among ﬁve chains studied
in an in-depth case study by Lewin-Solomons (2000a), the staﬀ of two chains reported unambiguously
that franchised units were more eﬃcient (in terms of proﬁt), one chain claimed that franchisee proﬁts
were more variable, one gave ambivalent answers, and in the ﬁnal chain, no company units existed for
comparison. Franchisees themselves almost uniformly claimed that franchises were more eﬃcient.
4seems therefore somewhat puzzling that royalties on revenues are the standard arrange-
ment in franchising.
One important reason for their popularity is the impossibility to eﬀectively monitor
costs (see e.g. Rubin, 1978 or Maness, 1996). Therefore, royalties on proﬁts are usually
not implementable. Fixed annual payments are suboptimal when both franchisees and
the chain must exert costly eﬀort to increase chain wide proﬁts, as is analysed by Lal
(1990) and Bhattacharyya & Lafontaine (1995). Royalties can also be preferable when
franchisees are risk-averse (see e.g. Norton, 1988 or Mathewson and Winter, 1992). For
an general overview on the topic see e.g. the surveys by Dnes (1996) and Lafontaine
& Raynaud (2002) or Chapter 3 in Blair & Lafontaine (2005). To keep our theoretical
a n a l y s i ss i m p l e ,w ed on o ti n c l u d et h e s ef a c t o r st h a tm a k er e v e n u e - b a s e dr o y a l t i e so p t i m a l ,
but rather take the empirical fact that royalties are revenue-based as given.
Alternative Explanations for the Plural Form in the Literature
The literature discusses several alternative explanations for the plural form, which we
brieﬂy review. An early branch of literature (e.g. Oxenfeldt & Kelly, 1969) considered
franchising and the plural form to be transitory phenomena that facilitate access to
initially scarce resources like capital (Caves & Murphy, 1976), managerial talent (Norton,
1988) or local information (Minkler, 1990). In the model of Gallini and Lutz (1992) the
transition is reversed: chains start with company-ownership to signal proﬁtable business
to franchisees but once signalling is successful they can move towards a higher fraction
of franchised stores.
To explain the long-run coexistence of company-owned and franchised stores, some
literature focus on diﬀerences between locations of individual stores. For example, Brick-
ely and Dark (1987) ﬁnd empirically that a smaller distance to chain headquarters or
a lower proportion of repeat business makes a store more likely to be company-owned.
Chakrabarty et. al. (2002) theoretically analyze how the plural form can arise if the
chain has better information about the proﬁtability of diﬀerent store locations.
Aﬀuso (2002) adopts a diﬀerent approach where the plural form can be optimal when
managers are heterogeneous and self-select into franchise or company-employment con-
tracts. She shows empirically that characteristics of store managers indeed signiﬁcantly
diﬀer between franchise and company-owned stores.
Other papers focus on chain wide implications of the decision to have some company-
owned stores. Scott (1995) and especially Lafontaine and Shaw (2005) have strong em-
pirical arguments that company ownership is important to protect a chain’s brand value.
Bai and Tao (2000) provide a corresponding theoretical model for the plural form, where
5goodwill-eﬀort of company-owned stores protects a chain’s brand name, while franchise
stores have higher sales eﬀorts. Sorensen and Sorensen (2001) explain the plural form by
focusing on the diﬀerent roles of franchise and company-owned stores in exploration and
organizational learning.
Our analysis, which focuses on the role of the plural form as a commitment device for
the chain and on the interaction with contractual commitments to uniform standards, is
deﬁnitely not targeted to substitute those existing explanations about the plural form,
b u ti sm e a n tt oc o m p l e m e n tt h ep r e v i o u si n s i g h t s .
3 Theoretical Analysis
We ﬁrst model the case where the chain decides endogenously on the fraction of company-
owned stores, but is obliged to uniform standards between franchise and company-owned
stores. Then, we brieﬂy verify that within this set-up, it is indeed, optimal for the chain to
always make a contractual commitment to uniform standards. Finally, we assume that
the fraction of company-owned stores is exogenously given and examine under which
conditions the chain prefers to commit to uniform standards.
Case 1: Endogenous fraction of company-owned stores when uni-
form standards are obligatory
We assume a store’s revenues and costs depend on external factors like customers’ pref-
erences or input prices, and on the chain’s activities such as its choice of products, ad-
vertisement, price-policy and the appearance of stores. The actual state of the world,
which characterizes all external factors, is denoted by x.E x - a n t e ,x is unknown and will
be randomly drawn from a commonly known distribution on a set of states X.
The chain headquarters observes the state and can decide on chain wide activities.
For a given state x ar e a ln u m b e ra is assigned to each activity, which can be interpreted
as the ”size” of an activity. Activities of higher size yield higher revenues, but also
lead to higher costs. For all franchise stores, costs are identically given by a function
C(a|x) that is twice diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex in a for all
x,i . e . C0(a|x) > 0 and C00(a|x) > 0. Furthermore, the Inada conditions C0(0|x)=0
and lima→∞ C0(a|x)=∞ shall hold for all x. A store’s revenues are given by a twice
diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing, and concave function R(a|x).
A chain consists of a continuum of stores with mass normalized to 1 (thus a chain’s
total size is ﬁxed). The fraction of company-owned stores in the chain is denoted by γ,
so that the fraction of franchised stores is 1 − γ.
6Following the arguments given in Section 2, we assume that company-owned stores
are run less eﬃciently than franchise stores. This is incorporated simply by assuming
that proﬁts of a company-owned store are by a ﬁxed amount L lower than proﬁts of a
franchise store.
When the state of the world is x and all stores of a chain implement activities a,t o t a l
proﬁt sa r et h u sg i v e nb y
π(a|x)=R(a|x) − C(a|x) − γL. (1)
An activity that maximizes total proﬁts at a state x is called eﬃcient and denoted by
ae(x). It follows from the assumptions on the cost and revenue functions that the eﬃcient





We model the interaction between the chain headquarters H and a representative fran-
chisee F by an extensive form game with the following timing:
1. The chain-headquarters H chooses a fraction of company-owned stores γ. Further-
more, H chooses a royalty ρ ∈ [0,1], which denotes the share of revenues that
f r a n c h i s e e sh a v et op a yt ot h ec h a i n .
2. F accepts or rejects the oﬀered franchise contract. If F rejects, H and F get both
an outside payoﬀ of 0.
3. Nature draws the state of the world x. H observes the state and chooses an activity
au ≤ a(x), which is uniformly implemented in all company and franchise stores.
Franchisee’s ﬁnal payoﬀsa r ei t sp r o ﬁts net of the royalty payments:
πF =( 1− ρ)R(au|x) − C(au|x) (3)
The chain’s payoﬀ consists of the royalty income from franchisees plus the proﬁts from
company-owned stores:
πH =( 1− γ)ρR(au|x)+γ(R(au|x) − C(au|x) − L) (4)
We assume that both F and H are risk-neutral and maximize their expected payoﬀ.
Depending on the state of the world x, there is an upper limit a(x) on the maximal
possible size of an activity. Without such a limit, the chain could impose activities of
arbitrarily high costs upon the franchisees, which is surely unrealistic, since franchisees
7always have the option to breach the contract or to drop out of the chain. Furthermore,
reputational concerns of the chain may impose a limit on activities’ size even if the state
of the world is imperfectly observable by the franchisees. We implicitly capture these
considerations by imposing this upper bound a(x).
We now solve this game via backward induction.
Stage 3
Since πH is concave in a, the activity that maximizes the chain’s payoﬀ,d e n o t e db ya∗
u,














Comparing with Equation (2), we ﬁnd that the chain’s preferred level of activity a∗
u is
weakly higher than the eﬃcient level of activities ae, and strictly higher whenever there
are positive royalties (ρ > 0) and some franchised stores (γ < 1). The gap between a∗
u and
the eﬃcient activity, is decreasing in the fraction of company-owned stores γ. Especially,
a∗
u converges to the eﬃcient activity as the fraction of company-owned stores γ converges
to 1.
The intuition behind these results is that an increased level of activity increases fran-
chisees’ revenues and thereby royalty payments to the chain, which gives H incentives to
demand activity levels above the eﬃcient level ae. On the other hand, an activity level
above ae reduces proﬁts of company-owned stores. A higher fraction of company-owned
stores makes the chain therefore prefer more eﬃcient activities. H selects a∗
u unless the










Franchisees accept the contract if and only if their expected payoﬀ,d e n o t e db yΠF(γ,ρ)
is non-negative, where expectations are taken over the possible states of the world x and
t h ec h o i c eo fau at Stage 3 is rationally predicted.
Stage 1
We denote the expected payoﬀ of the chain, conditionally on the contract being accepted,
by ΠH(γ,ρ). To avoid tedious case distinctions about whether it is proﬁtable to open up
a chain or not, the following regularity condition is imposed:
8Condition 1 There exist a combination of γ and ρ such that franchisees accept the
contract and H0s expected payoﬀ ΠH(γ,ρ) is strictly positive.
Lemma 1 characterizes the selected royalty rate ρ given γ :
Lemma 1 For any given fraction of compand-stores γ < 1 it holds true that
1. the chain’s expected payoﬀ (conditional on the contract being accepted) ΠH(γ,ρ) is
strictly increasing in the royalty ρ,
2. the franchisee’s expected payoﬀ ΠF(γ,ρ) is strictly decreasing in the royalty ρ,
3. there is a unique royalty ρu(γ) such that F0s expected payoff is zero,
4. H chooses ρu(γ) at Stage 1.
Since the royalty is set to the level ρu(γ) where franchisees have zero expected payoﬀ,
the chain’s expected payoﬀ is identical to the expected total proﬁt in the chain. The
optimal choice of the fraction of company-owned stores γ now balances two factors:
On the one hand, company-owned stores are less proﬁtable than franchise stores, but
on the other hand, a higher fraction of company-owned stores leads to the selection of
more eﬃcient activities at Stage 3. The second eﬀect is especially pronounced when the
upper bounds on sizes of activities a(x) are high, since without company-owned stores
ineﬃciencies would be quite large for high a(x). One the other hand, the marginal gains
from more eﬃcient activities converge to zero as the fraction of company-owned stores
goes to 1. That is the intuition behind the following result:
Proposition 1 If there is an obligation to uniform standards and the upper bounds on
the size of activities a(x) are suﬃciently large, the chain will be of the plural form, i.e.
H chooses γ ∈ (0,1).
We thus have shown that the plural form can endogenously arise in our model, even
though company-owned stores are less proﬁtable than franchise stores.
Case 2: Both commitment to uniform standards and fraction of
company-owned stores are endogenously determined
To see whether the chain prefers a commitment to uniform standards, we brieﬂye x a m i n e
the outcome of our model when the chain can select diﬀerent activities for franchise stores
than for company-owned stores. The previous model is modiﬁed such that at Stage 3 the
9chain headquarters can select diﬀerent activities for company-owned stores and franchise
stores.
Now, the chain selects for company-owned stores the eﬃcient level of activities ae at
Stage 3, in order to maximize company-owned stores’ proﬁts. For franchise stores the
chain selects the maximum activity a(x) in order to maximize royalty payments (unless
the royalty ρ is 0). As before, franchisees accept the contract at Stage 2 if and only if
their expected payoﬀ is non-negative.
The analysis of Stage 1 is straightforward because the selected activities in Stage 3 do
neither depend on the fraction of company-owned stores γ nor on the royalty ρ. Obviously,
the chain sets the royalty on that level where expected payoﬀ of franchisees is zero. Thus,
the headquarters’ expected income from a franchise store is given by Ex[R(a|x)−C(a|x)]
a n df r o mac o m p a n y - o w n e ds t o r eb yEx [(R(ae|x) − C(ae|x)) − L]. Neither of the two
expressions does depend on the fraction of company-owned stores γ. Hence, the chain
will be completely franchised if expected income from franchise stores is higher than that
of company-owned stores, and completely company-owned if the reverse is true. A plural
form can at most be equally proﬁtable, but this happens only in the non-generic case
where both types of stores make the same expected proﬁts.
This implies that it is weakly dominant for the chain to include a commitment to
uniform standards into the contract. Without uniform standards either complete fran-
chising or complete ownership is the optimal structure, but in those cases a commitment
to select the same activities for franchise and company-owned stores has obviously no
eﬀect. This means a commitment to uniform standards can never harm. Furthermore, it
directly follows that whenever the plural form is strictly optimal under a commitment to
uniform standards, making such a commitment is also strictly optimal. We summarize
this result in Proposition 2:
Proposition 2 When the fraction of company-owned stores is endogenously selected at
Stage 1, it is always optimal for the chain to include a commitment to uniform standards
into the franchise contract.
Proof. (see derivation above)
Case 3: Fraction of company-owned stores is exogenously given
We now analyse the case where the optimal fraction of company-owned stores is deter-
mined by factors outside our model, like those factors reviewed in Section 2. We consider
the extreme case where the fraction of company-owned stores is completely exogenously
given and examine under which conditions the chain optimally includes a commitment to
10uniform standards between franchise and company-owned stores into the franchise con-
tracts at Stage 1. We especially analyse whether – ceteris paribus – such a commitment
is optimal rather for a low or for a high fraction of company-owned stores.
Since the fraction of companies stores is exogenously given, it does not matter for
the analysis whether franchise stores are more eﬃcient than company-owned stores. To
simplify the exposition, we therefore assume that both type of stores are equally eﬃcient
(i.e. L =0 ).
Behavior in Stages 2 and 3 with uniformity requirement is the same as analyzed in Case
1 and without a uniformity requirement the same as analyzed in Case 2. Furthermore,
royalties are again uniquely determined by the condition that franchisee’s expected payoﬀ
at Stage 2 is zero. The headquarters’ expected payoﬀ is therefore given by the expected
proﬁts of franchised restaurants plus expected proﬁts of company-owned restaurants and
can be written as
Π
u
H(γ) ≡ Ex[π(au|x)] (7)
Π
n
H(γ) ≡ Ex[(1 − γ)π(a|x)+γπ(ae|x)] (8)
for the cases with (superscript u) and without (superscript n) ac o m m i t m e n tt ou n i f o r -




Before presenting the general results, consider a simple example. Assume costs and
revenues do not depend on the state of the world and are given by R(a|x)=a and
C(a|x)=a2.T h ee ﬃcient size of activities is then given by ae =0 .5. Assume the chain
can force activities up to a maximum size of a =0 .75. Figure 1 shows the chains’ payoﬀ
with and without uniformity requirement as a function of the fraction of company-owned
stores.
Two features of the example are generally true: First, if the chain is completely fran-
chised or completely company-owned then uniform standards are obviously irrelevant
and have no eﬀect on the chains’ expected payoﬀ. Second, the chains’ expected pay-
oﬀ (weakly) increases in the fraction of company-owned stores in both cases: with and
without a uniformity requirement.
With a uniformity requirement the chain’s payoﬀ Πu
H(γ) increases in γ because a higher
fraction of company-owned stores leads to the selection of more eﬃcient activities au at
Stage 3. This eﬀect occurs whenever the fraction of company-owned stores is suﬃciently
high, such that the headquarter sets at Stage 3 activity au = a∗
u. For a small fraction
of company-owned stores (in the example for γ ≤ 0.25)w eﬁnd that Πu
H(γ) is constant,
because a∗
u > a. This means the chain selects activities of maximal possible size a(x),
which does not depend on γ.





























Figure 1: Example: Chain’s income in cases with and without uniformity requirement as
a function of the fraction of company stores.
Without a uniformity requirement, the chain’s payoﬀ Πn
H(γ) increases in γ because
company-stores implement eﬃcient activities whereas franchised stores are forced to im-
plement the ineﬃcient activities a(x). In the example Πu
H(γ) crosses Πn
H(γ) from below
at γ = 1
3.
Thus, it is optimal for the chain to include a uniformity requirement into the contract
whenever the fraction of company-owned stores is higher than a third.
Parts of this result carry over to the general case. Under the suﬃcient condition
that the upper bound on activities is higher than the eﬃcient level of activities, i.e.
a(x) >a e(x), for all possible states x, we can show that for suﬃciently high levels of γ
it is optimal to commit to uniform standards and that for suﬃciently low levels of γ it
is optimal not being committed to uniform standards. We cannot, however, generally
exclude the possibility that Πu
H(γ) and Πn
H(γ) cross more than once. Proposition 3 states
this result:
Proposition 3 If the fraction of company-owned stores γ is exogenously given, there
are thresholds γ < 1 and γ > 0, such that for all suﬃciently high γ, i.e. γ < γ < 1,
committing to uniform standards is strictly optimal for the chain and for all suﬃciently
low γ, i.e. 0 < γ < γ, it is strictly optimal not to be committed to uniform standards.
This result suggests a positive correlation between the fraction of company-owned
stores and the existence of a uniformity requirement in contracts. This is one of the
questions we analyse in the following section.
124 Empirical Analysis
Data
The data of our empirical analysis is derived from a study of franchise systems that were
selected using Entrepreneur Magazine’s 1997 Franchise 500. The data was collected in the
year 1999. Chains were limited to the food industry, and were also included only if they
contained a minimum number of franchised stores (40), had begun franchising no later
than 1987, and were reasonably stable in that they remained in the Franchise 500 for at
least three consecutive years. Chains that began franchising in 1985 or later were included
only if the ratio between franchised and company-owned stores was stable. Of the 70
chains ﬁtting these criteria, 24 were entirely franchised or almost entirely franchised (5 or
fewer company-owned stores or more than 99.5% franchised). Due to the time-consuming
nature of data collection and processing, we included only 12 of such chains, chosen at
random, resulting in a stratiﬁed sample of 58 chains. For these chains, we attempted
to obtain the UFOC (Uniform Franchise Oﬀering Circular) and other documents. This
i n f o r m a t i o np r o v e di m p o s s i b l et oo b t a i no ri n a d e q u a t ei n2 1c h a i n s( 36.2%). The dataset
therefore consists of 37 chains.
For each of these chains, the UFOC and other documents were analysed in order to
obtain measures for the decision power of the chain headquarters and the strength of
a contractual commitment to uniform standards. Diﬀerent measures were created for
changes related to new products and changes related to building work. Furthermore,
for each chain two franchisees were chosen at random to be interviewed by telephone
or fax.1 These interviews focused on the extent of chain’s headquarters’ decision power
and franchisees inﬂuence, as well as the role of uniform standards between franchise and
company-owned stores. To avoid selection bias, the same franchisees were contacted
repeatedly until a response was obtained; thus the participation rate was close to 100%.
Basic statistics on each chain were also collected, including the numbers of franchised and
company-owned stores for 1998. Table 1 shows the distribution of fraction of company-
owned stores in the sample.
 
Table 1:  Distribution of fraction of company stores in the sample 
γ ∈  0  (0,.1] (.1,.2] (.2,.3] (.3,.4] (.5,.6] (.6,.7] (.7,.8] (.8,.9] (.9,1] 
No.  of  chains  6  11  5 2 4 3 2 3 0 1 
 
1In one chain, only one such interview could be obtained.
13Structure of the analysis
We ﬁrst give a descriptive overview of the contract analysis and the interview results that
shows that the decision power of the chain headquarters is indeed very strong in most
chains. Then we analyze whether a commitment to uniform standards between franchise
and company-owned stores appears in franchise contracts and how such a commitment
is related to a chain’s fraction of company-owned stores.
Decision power within a chain
Franchise contracts were classiﬁed according to the chain’s decision power in two ar-
eas: the introduction of new products and changes in building requirements. Table 2
summarizes the results:
 
Table 2: Decision power according to franchise contracts  prod.  build. 
1: Nothing can be found in the contract suggesting that franchisees play a role in 
decisions about changes in products / building requirements. No franchise 
association exists. 
70% 62% 
2: Contract indicates that changes must be reasonable or that a franchisee body 
(such as a franchise association) exists (that must be consulted or is normally 
consulted as a matter of routine) 
24% 32% 
3: Contract indicates that the chain cannot enforce changes of this sort on franchisee 
unless franchisees agree, or unless a representative franchisee body agrees.  5% 5% 
 
T h el e f tc o l u m ns h o w st h ec l a s s i ﬁcation category and the right columns the fractions of
chains whose contracts fall into these categories with respect to product and building de-
cisions. Overall, franchisees have slightly more rights with respect to changes in building
requirements, but nevertheless in most chains the contracts give very strong or exclusive
decision rights to the chain.
Note that although contracts usually grant franchisees only little decision power, the
chain nevertheless often seeks advice from franchisees. Table 3 summarizes results of an
interview question addressing this issue.
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Table 3: Influence of franchisees on product decisions 
Q: In deciding whether to introduce new products or change existing products, how much does your 
chain rely on advice from franchisees? Which of the following statements comes closest describing 
your chain? 
1: Franchisees do not provide important advice.  The chain relies on its own experts.  9% 
2: Franchisees sometimes provide important feedback, but our influence is limited.  36% 
3: The chain actively seeks out feedback from franchisees because often they are very 
critical and/or knowledgeable and the chain appreciates that.  Our influence is substantial.  
35% 
4: The chain always seeks advice from our franchisees, and a change rarely takes place if 
franchisees don’t think it’s a good idea.  Our influence is tremendous.  19% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.62 
 
More than half of the answers state that franchisees chain often seeks advice from fran-
chisees, which can also give franchisees inﬂuence on actual decisions. Nevertheless, still
45% of franchisees characterize their actual inﬂuence in the decision process as limited or
not existent. Also, in our opinion such forms of informal inﬂuence provide no guarantee
that franchisees will not be exploited by the decisions made by the franchise chain.
An important question for actual decision power in a chain is how strictly franchisees
must adhere to decisions made by the chain headquarters. Corresponding interview
results are summarized in Table 4.
 
Table 4: Leeway in diverging from official requirements 
Q: I want to understand how much informal leeway franchisees have when the chain makes a 
decision about new products or a change in an existing product.  Suppose that such a change takes 
place and a franchisee does not like the change. Which of the following statements comes closest 
describing your chain? 
1: He has to go along with the change because that’s part of the deal when you become a 
franchisee.  39% 
2: If he doesn’t want to implement the change, he can request an exemption and 
occasionally such exemptions are granted.  38% 
3: If he doesn’t want to implement the change, he can request an exemption, and very often 
such exemptions are granted.   12% 
4: The chain trusts its experienced franchisees and often looks the other way when they do 
their own thing because it knows that they must have good reasons for doing so.  11% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.76 
 
The answers suggest that in most chains, franchisees have to follow the chain’s decisions
quite strictly, although in some chains exemptions are regularly granted.
Our theoretical analysis focuses on diverging interests of the chain and its franchisees in
the selection of activities. Is dissatisfaction about chains’ decisions a commonly observed
element in franchise relations? Table 5 shows that indeed some, but also not overwhelming
much, dissatisfaction is reported by franchisees.
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Table 5: Franchisees’ satisfaction with chain’s decisions 
Q: In some chains, franchisees are very satisfied with decisions made by the chain.  In others, there 
is some conflict over certain decisions, or franchisees might quietly not like some of the things the 
chain asks them to do.  I want to understand how much conflict exists.  (There may be none at all.)  
Read all of the following choices and tell me which is closest to being your opinion: 
1: The chain is pretty much always right on.  I hardly even have any problem with their 
policies, and I wouldn’t object, even if I could.  30% 
2: I hardly ever have a problem with the chain’s policies, but occasionally, they ask me to 
do something that I’d rather not do.  49% 
3: They often ask me do something I would rather not do. It’s happened quite a few times.   22% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.09 (not signifcant) 
 
The low correlation of the answers from the interviewed franchisees of the same chains,
suggests, that satisfaction levels are speciﬁc for each franchisee and are not necessarily
a characteristic element of certain chains. We also do not ﬁnd a signiﬁcant correlation
between dissatisfaction and the fraction of company-owned stores in a chain.
Uniform standards between franchise and company-owned stores
Next, we examined whether a clause on uniform standards can be found in the franchise
contract and how strong is the commitment to uniform standards with respect to product
innovations and building requirements. The analysis is based on those 31 chains in our
sample that have a positive number of company-owned stores. Table 6 summarizes the
results.
Table 6: Uniformity requirement in franchise contracts  prod.  build. 
1: Nothing in the contract indicates a commitment to uniformity. No mentioning of 
a system of uniform units. 
13% 13% 
2: The contract mentions a system of uniform units.  23%  16% 
3: Contract indicates that the chain cannot enforce activities on franchisees unless 
those activities are chain wide. Typically the contract includes a commitment by the 
chain to maintain uniform standards. 
55% 52% 
4: The contract is explicit about its statement connected to uniform standards, with 
no room for interpretation.  10% 19% 
 
Overall, uniformity is mentioned in 83% of contracts and a commitment to uniform stan-
d a r d sc a nb ef o u n di nam a j o r i t yo fc h a i n s ,a lthough often with some room for interpre-
tation.
We now examine the theoretical prediction that a commitment to uniform standards is
more likely to be beneﬁcial when the fraction of company-owned stores is high. There are
indeed positive rank order correlations (Spearman’s ρ) between the fraction of company-
owned stores and our measures of commitment to uniform standards of 0.54 (product)
16and 0.53 (building), which both are signiﬁcant at a one percent level. To control for
additional factors, like the royalty or the main product of the chain, we perform ordered
probit regressions, summarized in Table 7.
 
Table 7: Ordered probit regression for contractual commitment to uniform standards 
Independent variables  Product  Building requirements 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Fraction of company stores γ      3.85*** 
(1.23) 
    5.12*** 
(1.64) 
     3.37*** 
(1.10) 
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Notes: Estimated standard errors in parentheses.  Number of observations: 31 
*** / ** / * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. 
 
 
Despite the small sample size, we ﬁnd for all four speciﬁcations a strongly signiﬁcant
impact of the fraction of company-owned stores on the strength of a commitment to
uniform standards. Except for the weakly signiﬁcant dummy for chains with ice cream as
main product (which may be due to spurious correlation), no other factor can signiﬁcantly
explain the degree of contractual commitment to uniform standards.
We also investigate the role of uniformity in our interview questions. Franchisees
were asked whether uniform treatment of franchisees and company-owned stores is often
17violated or not.
 
Table 8: Uniform standards, interview results 
Q: Most of the time when a chain introduces a product, the introduction is system-wide, in 
both company stores and franchised stores.  I want to understand whether this is just the 
way things happen, or whether the chain actually has to do things this way, contractually. 
Which of the following statements comes closest to describing your chain? 
 
1: There is no policy to maintain uniform standards.  Sometimes franchisees must 
adopt practices that are different from those adopted in company stores. 
12% 
2: The chain does not legally have to maintain uniform standards, but they do so as a 
matter of policy. 
2% 
3: The chain does maintain uniform standards (between company stores and 
franchised stores), but I’m not sure if they legally have to do this. 
56% 
4: The chain must maintain the same standards in franchised and company-owned 
stores.  Franchisees cannot legally be forced to adopt any practice that is not also 
adopted in company stores.   
31% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: 0.57 
 
The results (see Table 8) show that uniformity standards generally seem quite strong,
although still 12% of franchisees report that they sometimes have to adopt diﬀerent prac-
tices than company-owned stores. Somewhat surprising, from our theoretical perspec-
tive, the answers to this question are neither signiﬁcantly correlated with our contractual
measure of uniformity, nor is there a signiﬁcant correlation with the fraction of company-
owned stores in a chain. This indicates that – at least for most decisions – adherence to
uniform standards is driven also by alternative factors of the business-environment that
seem to be to some degree independent of the actual contractual clauses.
In line with our model it is generally true, however, that the maintenance of uniform
standards plays an important role for franchisees:
 
Table 9: Importance of uniform standards 
Q: How important is it to you that the chain maintain uniform standards? 
1: This policy is not very important.  0% 
2: This policy is moderately important.  35% 
3: This policy is very important.  65% 
Rank order correlation (Spearman’s ρ) between the two interviews of a chain: -0.06 (not signif.) 
 
5S u m m a r y
We presented a formal model that analyses the optimal choice of the fraction of company-
owned stores and contractual commitments to uniform standards. The main idea is based
18on the well known fact that franchisees pay revenue-based royalties, which can lead to
selection of ineﬃcient activities by the chain. Since company-ownership allows the chain
a credible commitment to select activities that are more eﬃcient, a positive fraction of
company-owned stores can arise in our model where franchise stores are always run more
eﬃciently. This mechanism only works if the chain must maintain uniform standards that
require to select the same activities in franchise and company-owned stores.
If the fraction of company-owned stores is determined by exogenous factors, the analy-
sis showed that it is optimal for a chain to include a commitment to uniform standards
into franchise contracts if the fraction of company-owned stores is high, but to omit such
a commitment if the fraction of company-owned stores is low.
An empirical analysis of contract and interview data from the US fast-food industry
gave an descriptive overview of the distribution of decision power within the chains and
the importance of uniform standards and tested whether uniform standards are more
often observed in chains where the fraction of company-owned stores is high. There is
indeed a signiﬁcantly positive correlation between the fraction of company-owned stores
and the occurrence of a commitment to uniformity standards in the analysed franchise
contracts. The positive relationship remained signiﬁcant when controlling for additional
chain-speciﬁc characteristics.
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20Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :1. We have the deﬁnition ΠH(λ,ρ): =Ex[πH(au(x,γ,ρ),γ,ρ|x)].














Recall that for a given state of the world, H either selects au = a∗
u or au = a (if a∗
u ≥ a).
In the ﬁrst case, we have
∂πH(a|x)
∂a |a=au =0 , since a∗
u maximizes πH(a|x). In the second
case, we have ∂au








=( 1− γ)ExR(au|x) > 0.






















If au = a then the derivative ∂au
∂ρ is zero. We then ﬁnd
∂ΠF
∂ρ = −ExR(au|x) < 0.
If au = a∗




















3. F0se x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ ΠF(γ,ρ) is non-positive for ρ =1(franchisees do not keep any
revenues) and non-negative for ρ =0(follows from Condition 1 and the fact that eﬃcient
activities ae are selected at Stage 3 if ρ =0 ). Since, furthermore, for every given γ the
function ΠF(γ,ρ) is continuous in ρ and strictly decreasing in ρ, there exists for every
fraction of company-owned stores a unique royalty rate ρu(γ) such that ΠF(γ,ρu(γ)) = 0.
4. As last step, we show that for H always selects a royalty of ρu(γ).I fΠF(γ,ρ) < 0
then F would reject the contract, which cannot be optimal for H, since by Condition 1
there exists a contract under which H makes strictly positive proﬁts. If ΠF(γ,ρ) > 0 then
by continuity there exists a small increase in ρ such that ΠF(γ,ρ) is still non-negative.
Such a small increase in ρ, however, strictly increases H0s expected payoﬀ.¥
Proof of Proposition 1: We ﬁrst show that the chain will not be completely franchised.
Assume by contradiction H maximizes payoﬀ with a completely franchised chain (γ =0 ) .
In this case, H sets maximum activities a(x) at Stage 3 whenever there is a positive roy-
alty ρ > 0. However, when these activities a(x) are suﬃciently big, franchise stores’ proﬁts
before royalties are paid, i.e. R(a(x)|x) − C(a(x)|x), are already negative. This follows
directly from our assumptions on cost and revenue functions. Thus, for suﬃciently big
a(x) and no company-ownership, franchisees accept a contract if and only if the royalty
is ρ =0 . But for ρ =0and γ =0 , t h ec h a i nh a sap a y o ﬀ of zero. This cannot be optimal,
since we assumed that there is a combination of γ and ρ such that contracts are accepted
and the chain has a strictly positive expected payoﬀ.
21We now show that it is also not optimal to have a completely company-owned chain,
s i n c ei ta l w a y si n c r e a s e sH0s expected when at least a small fraction of stores is franchised.
For any γ < 1, the royalty is set such that franchisees expected proﬁts are 0. Thus, H’s
payoﬀ per store equals the average proﬁts per store, given by
π(γ|x)=R(au|x) − C(au(x,γ,ρ)|x) − γL









Consider ﬁrst the case where the eﬃcient activities can be implemented, i.e. ae(x) < a(x).
In a fully company-owned chain, eﬃcient activities are selected at Stage 3, i.e. au(x|γ =




The same formula holds in the case ae(x) > a(x), since then au = a and thus dau
dγ =0 . In
summary, a small decrease of γ below 1 strictly increases the chain’s expected payoﬀ.¥






denote the diﬀerence in the chain’s payoﬀ from the optimal contract with uniformity
requirement compared to the optimal contract without uniformity requirement. We ﬁrst
establish Lemma 2:
Lemma 2 The derivative of D(γ) is given by
D




−(1 − ρn)R(ae|x) − C(ae|x))].
Proof of Lemma 2: The proof is based on straightforward calculation. First note
that D c a nb ew r i t t e na s
D(γ)=Ex[(1 − γ)ρuR(au|x)+γ(R(au|x) − C(au|x) − L)]
−Ex[(1 − γ)ρnR(a|x)+γ(R(ae|x) − C(ae|x) − L)]
Diﬀerentiating w.r.t. γ yields
D









−((1 − ρn)R(ae|x) − C(ae|x))]
22To evaluate this expressions we need two distinguish two sets of states. For those states
where a∗
u(x) ≥ a(x), we ﬁnd au(x)=a(x) and thus dau
dγ =0 , i.e. the term in the second
line becomes 0. For those states with a∗
u(x) < a we ﬁnd au(x)=a∗







R0(au|x) holds. Inserting this equality into the expression for
D0(γ) above, we ﬁnd that the term in the second line again becomes 0. Therefore, the
equality stated in the Lemma holds.¥
We can now proof Proposition 3. As noted in the text, we assume that the condition
a(x) >a e(x) holds for all states x.
Proof of Proposition 3: Note that D(γ) is a continuous function with D(0) =
D(1) = 0. Therefore, it suﬃces to show that D0(0) < 0 and D0(1) < 0. First consider the
case γ =0 . We then have au = a, ρu = ρn and
dρu
dγ =0 . Inserting into the expression of
D0(γ) from Lemma 2 yields
D
0(0) = Ex [(1 − ρn)R(a|x) − C(a|x) − ((1 − ρn)R(ae|x) − C(ae|x))] < 0
This is the diﬀerence of F0sp a y o ﬀ under the maximum size of activities and F0sp a y o ﬀ
under eﬃcient activities. This diﬀerence is clearly negative.
Now consider the case γ =1 . Then au = ae and ρu > ρn, which gives
D
0(1) = Ex [(1 − ρu)R(ae|x) − C(ae|x) − ((1 − ρn)R(ae|x) − C(ae|x))]
= −(ρu − ρn)ExR(ae|x) < 0.¥
23